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SALIX V. USFS; WHEN IS AGENCY CONSULTATION
REQUIRED UNDER THE ESA?
Michelle Tafoya
Nos. 13-35624 and 13-35631
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Oral Argument: Monday, July 7, 2014, 9:00 a.m. in the Portland
Pioneer Courtroom, Portland, Oregon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has been called the
“heart of the ESA” because it requires interagency consultation before
undertaking actions that may harm endangered species.1 In Salix v.
United States Forest Service, the United States District Court held the
United States Forest Service (USFS) had to reinitiate consultation on a
management plan amendment after the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
belatedly designated critical habitat for the Canada lynx.2 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit will address two other issues common to ESA challenges,
standing and injunctive relief, in addition to the § 7 consultation
requirement.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2000, FWS listed the entire population of the Canada lynx in the
contiguous U.S. as a threatened species under the ESA.3 The listing
necessarily involved a significant area of federal land managed by
USFS.4 As mandated by § 7 of the ESA, USFS consulted with FWS on
the Northern Rockies Lynx Amendment (Amendment) to supplement
USFS management plans.5 At the time of consultation, FWS had not
listed any critical habitat for the lynx on USFS lands despite the statutory
requirement that it do so at the time of species listing.6 Despite this error,
FWS approved the Amendment and USFS supplemented 20 national
forest management plans in a single Record of Decision.7
In 2009, FWS finally designated lynx critical habitat in 11 national
forests, almost ten years after the species was listed.8 Plaintiffs Nolan
1

W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 495 (9th Cir. 2011).
Salix v. U.S. Forest Serv., 944 F. Supp. 2d 984 (D. Mont. 2013).
Id. at 986.
4
Id.
5
Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1563 (a)(2) (1973).
6
Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1553 (b)(6)(C) (2003).
7
Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
8
Id.
2
3

14

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 75

Salix and the Cottonwood Environmental Law Center (CELC), bringing
suit under the ESA’s citizen suit provision, contended USFS should have
reinitiated consultation on the Amendment after the critical habitat
designation.9 While § 7 remained central to this case, the court also
addressed two other issues in detail: whether the plaintiff had Article III
standing and whether specific or broad injunctive relief was justified.10
The court first held the environmental plaintiffs established the three
elements of standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.11
Specifically, the plaintiffs successfully argued that USFS’s failure to
reinitiate consultation with FWS threatened lynx habitat and, as a result,
the plaintiff’s opportunity to view lynx in the wild.12 While the federal
defendants claimed the plaintiffs needed to challenge each of the 20
management plans separately to establish standing, the court vehemently
disagreed.13 Citing Ninth Circuit case law, the court held, “plaintiffs may
challenge a programmatic regulation that affects multiple forests so long
as they allege a particularized injury in a specific area that is affected by
the regulation and that will be subject to an agency action that relies on
the regulation.”14 The court also found irrelevant the defendant’s
argument that site specific biological opinions for two projects within
lynx critical habitat undermined the plaintiff’s injury in fact claim.15
Consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, the court ruled that such site
specific analysis after the fact cannot cure an initial, procedural failure to
conduct an environmental review in the first place.16
The court also ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the consultation
issue, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Amendment was not an
“agency action” under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA.17 Instead, the court upheld
Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, a Ninth Circuit case which previously
rejected the same argument by USFS.18 USFS’s arguments in this case
were based on NEPA case law and a Tenth Circuit decision.19 However,
Ninth Circuit precedent interprets an ESA “agency action” more broadly
than a NEPA action, and directly holds forest plans as “ongoing,
affirmative agency actions.”20 Ultimately, the court held USFS violated
the ESA when it failed to reinitiate consultation with FWS after a
statutory triggering event occurred, the lynx critical habitat designation,

9

Id.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 987.
12
Id. at 988.
13
Salix, 944 F.Supp.2d at 988.
14
Id. at 989.
15
Id. at 989–991.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 995, 999.
18
Id. at 999; Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
19
Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 996–998.
20
Id. at 997–998.
10
11
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and ordered USFS to reinitiate consultation.21
The District Court then turned to the relief requested by the
environmental plaintiffs; an injunction on all USFS projects covered by
the Amendment.22 While the court noted the broad standard for imposing
injunctive relief in ESA cases, it also turned to Ninth Circuit precedent
which directs plaintiffs to show irreparable injury in order to justify such
relief.23 In this case, the plaintiffs claimed the lack of agency analysis
would impair their lynx viewing opportunities in two project areas.24 The
court was not satisfied with this argument because there was “no
showing that the harm is likely to occur despite the site specific analysis
or that the harm is irreparable.”25 Thus, the court denied the plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief on the specific projects named, or on any
other project, covered by the Amendment.26
III. ARGUMENTS FROM THE PARTIES’ BRIEF ON APPEAL
A. Environmental Plaintiff-Appellee CELC
1. Section 7 gives first priority to endangered species, reflecting a
national policy to protect listed species from harmful agency actions.27
Injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy in this case because longstanding U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent holds an
injunction to be the necessary remedy when a significant procedural
violation of the ESA occurs.28 In ESA cases, “irreparable harm is
presumed to flow from a failure to properly evaluate the environmental
impact of an agency action.”29 The defendants mistakenly rely on NEPA
cases to support their position to the contrary.30 However, the ESA’s
language shows “Congress intended to depart from the normal
requirement of showing a likelihood of irreparable harm before an
injunction issues in cases where an agency has not fulfilled its § 7
duties.”31 A programmatic injunction is appropriate here, even in the
absence of site specific challenges and a greater showing of irreparable
harm.32 Alternatively, even if a showing of irreparable harm is required,
an injunction is still proper because the plaintiffs have established that
21

Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1001–1002.
Id.
24
Id. at 1002.
25
Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
26
Id.
27
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
28
Pl./Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Reply Br., Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., at 4–7
(9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2014) (Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631).
29
Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985).
30
Pl./Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Reply Br., supra n. 28, at 5–10.
31
Id. at 9–10.
32
Id.
22
23

16

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 75

the Amendment is likely to cause such harm. The lynx was listed under
the ESA due to the lack of conservation planning on the part of USFS.33
The current Amendment allows for forest thinning and other actions that
are harmful to lynx critical habitat.34 Therefore, the application of the
Amendment should be enjoined until FWS reinitiates consultation to
avoid harmful agency action.35
2. CELC is not required to challenge site-specific projects to
establish standing in this case. Rather, a “programmatic procedural
challenge” is sufficient under Ninth Circuit case law. The plaintiffs
identified three site specific projects where the Amendment applies and
where they definitely plan to return. They also established imminent,
concrete, and particularized harm to their esthetic interest of seeing the
lynx in the wild; an injury which can be redressed by ruling in CELC’s
favor.36
B. Amici Brief in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee
The brief further reinforces CELC’s argument for injunctive relief.
In short, two tourism businesses contend that keystone species such as
the lynx are essential to maintain intact ecosystems and the USFS
violation of § 7 will harm the Greater Yellowstone economy if an
injunction is not issued.37
C. Federal Defendants-Appellants USFS
1. CELC failed to show any concrete, particularized injury caused by
USFS’s decision not to reinitiate consultation on the Amendment. To
establish standing there must be a distinct, palpable injury.38 Here, CELC
makes “vague or conclusory assertions about hypothetical or abstract
harms” which are “devoid of specific facts explaining how the agency’s
application of the Lynx Amendment injures its members’ concrete
interests.”39 CELC cannot sidestep the standing requirement by claiming
this to be a procedural rights case.40 Even if it were, procedural
challenges like those found in NEPA still require some showing of injury
in fact apart from the procedural injury.41 CELC fails in this regard
33

65 Fed. Reg. 16502, 16082 (March 24, 2000).
Pl./Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Reply Br., supra n. 28, at 17–18.
Id. at 18–19.
36
Id. at 25–27.
37
Br. of Amici Curiae Big Wild Adventures & Nat. Exposures in Support of Cottonwood Envtl. Law
Ctr. and Injunctive Relief, Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., at 2–5 (9th Cir. Jan. 28,
2014) (Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631).
38
Ans./Reply Br. on Cross-App. for the Fed. Defs., Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
at 2 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2014) (Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631).
39
Id. at 4–6.
40
Id. at 8–9.
41
Id. at 10.
34
35
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because it does not contest a site-specific project caused by the
Amendment’s application.42 Thus, CELC fails to prove injury in fact,
causation, or redressability and lacks standing in this case.
2. Under the ESA, USFS was not required to reinitiate consultation
on the Amendment because USFS did not trigger § 7 via any action on
the existing, amended forest plans.43 CELC’s reliance on Pacific Rivers
is in error because the Supreme Court’s opposite ruling on NEPA land
use plans overrules the proposition that such plans constitute ongoing
agency action.44 The regulatory definition of the term “action” in NEPA
and the ESA are not “meaningfully different” and thus Pacific Rivers is
effectively overruled.45 “The ESA, its implementing regulations, and
binding case law make clear that the mere existence of a forest plan is
not action.”46
3. The district court properly ruled against injunctive relief in this
case because CELC failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.47 As
discussed above, “alleging the deprivation of a procedural right” is
insufficient to prove likely harm.48 Despite CELC’s claims, “Hill did not
establish a presumption in favor of injunctive relief” in ESA cases.49
Additionally, CELC’s requests an overly broad injunction because it
asserted injury for only three projects, but requests to enjoin all projects
covered by the Amendment.50
B. Amici Brief in Support of Defendants-Appellants
The brief further reinforces USFS’s argument that forest plans
should no longer be considered an agency action under recent case law.51
Further, the brief reiterates the contention that injunctive relief is not
automatic in ESA cases and should not be granted here due to a lack of
irreparable harm.52
IV. ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, the Ninth Circuit is likely to affirm the district
court’s holding in favor of standing. Not only is it rare for standing to fail
42

Id. at 14.
Id. at 27.
44
Id. at 28.
45
Id. at 29–31.
46
Id. at 48.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 50.
49
Id. at 53.
50
Id. at 56–57.
51
Mot. of Am. Forest Resource Council, Pub. Lands Council, Mont. Wood Prods. Assn. Inc., Mont.
Logging Assn., Associated Logging Contractors, Inc., Cal. Foresty Assn, and Douglas Timber
Operators to Appear as Amici Curiae in Support of Fed. Appellants, Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v.
U.S. Forest Serv., at 7–11 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2013) (Nos. 13-35624, 13-35631).
52
Id. at 23–24.
43
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in environmental cases, but the plaintiffs here have also seemingly
followed an established framework for success.53 Specifically, the
plaintiffs contend USFS’s failure to reinitiate consultation threatens the
lynx and thus their opportunity to see the species in national forests,
places where they often recreate and intend to return. The plaintiffs are
also likely to overcome USFS’s site-specific argument against standing.54
In two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to bring a
facial challenge to a forest plan without requiring a challenge to the
plan’s specific projects.55
The plaintiffs also make a good case on the § 7 issue by relying on
Pacific Rivers, which clearly held forest plans to be ongoing agency
actions consistent with ESA consultation requirements.56 USFS’s claim
that Norton, a 2004 NEPA case, effectively overruled this precedent will
likely fail given Ninth Circuit precedent construing ESA “agency
actions” more broadly than NEPA’s counterpart.57 Additionally, USFS’s
reliance on a Tenth Circuit case which explicitly rejected Pacific Rivers
will likely fail for two reasons: one, no other Circuit has followed the
Tenth Circuit’s ruling and, second, the Ninth Circuit continued to cite
Pacific Rivers with approval after Norton.58 Thus, the court will likely
require USFS to reinitiate consultation because the Amendment is an
ongoing agency action under the ESA.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit will likely affirm the district court’s
holding against injunctive relief. Not only does the court review the
denial of an injunction for an abuse of discretion, the plaintiffs here also
fail to allege specific, irreparable harm. Unless the court finds the
procedural injury is sufficient to establish harm, the general claim of
potentially impaired lynx sightings is simply inadequate to demonstrate
irreparable injury.59
Lower Court: District of Montana Cause No. CV 12-45-M-DLC;
Honorable Dana L. Christensen, District Court Judge of the United State
District Court, District of Montana.
Attorney for Appellants: John Philip Meyer, Cottonwood Environmental
Law Center, Bozeman, Montana and Matt Kenna, Durango, Colorado.

53

George C. Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Pub. Nat. Resources Law § 8:9, 8:11 (2d ed., C.
Boardman 2014).
54
Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011); Pac. Rivers Council v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 689 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012).
55
Id.
56
Pac. Rivers Council, 30 F.3d at 1056.
57
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004); Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1024 (9th Cir. 2012).
58
Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007); Salix, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 997–999.
59
Nat. Resources Def. Council v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2007).
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